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Risk in recovery: views of non executive directors 
of UK building societies 
 
The financial crisis and the research focus 
 
Just over three years ago the UK financial sector witnessed the rapid deterioration and 
failure of the Northern Rock Bank. Customers – savers – formed long queues outside 
the provincial and suburban offices of this former regional building society, de-
mutualised in 1997 under the 1986 Building Society Act powers. The pictures and 
images served to emphasise and visually illustrate the most significant and substantial 
run on a UK Bank for over 150 years. Just a year later Lehman Brothers filed for US 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy – with total pre-bankruptcy assets valued at almost $640 
billion making it the largest bankruptcy in US financial history dwarfing the earlier 
touchstone of Corporate Governance failure, that of the Enron Corporation.  
 
Expressions of shock and disbelief littered the financial and business press: the 
Director-General of the Building Society Association (BSA) noting at the time that 
the period has indeed ‘been utterly, unbelievably, astonishing’ (Adrian Coles, 
Director-General of the Building Societies Association, quoted in Pollock 2008). For 
this particular sector – the Building Society ‘mutual’ sector – the backdrop of the 
previously noted 1986 Building Society Act is significant: this recent period has seen 
the last remaining truly independent flag-bearer of the 1986 de-mutualisation process 
falter.  
 
The UK Government’s reaction has been to focus on the nature of the banking 
collapse, with the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee into the Banking 
Crisis (HC 2009) identifying two key themes in relation to risk: 
 
 that risk and complexity within the banking sector had increased dramatically 
over the previous twenty years with a widespread, but often misguided belief 
that risk was being dispersed and ‘managed’; and 
 there had been a financial sector demonstrating significantly increased 
leverage, with those demonstrating the greatest appetite for rapid growth 
through leverage being amongst the heaviest casualties. 
 
Two key reports have served to focus both the concerns and the future expectations of 
the broader financial service sector:   
 
a) The Financial Services Authority (FSA), through the Turner Review (2009), 
considered how to frame a regulatory response to the global banking crisis 
focusing on, amongst other areas, a new approach to regulation: designed to be 
‘more intrusive and more systemic’. Importantly in relation to the focus of this 
work, the Turner Review has also suggested a seismic shift in the governing 
role of non-executives, supporting greater challenge from a more 
professionalised body of NEDs. 
 
b) Then the Government appointed Walker Review (2009) of Corporate 
Governance of UK Banking Industry set out to consider and review ‘corporate 
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governance in UK banks in the light of the experience of critical loss and 
failure throughout the banking system’ (Preface).  At the centre of its 
examination were a number of risk specific concerns: 
 
 effectiveness of risk management at board level, including the incentives in 
remuneration policy to manage risk effectively  
 the effectiveness of board practices and the performance of audit, risk, 
remuneration and nomination committees 
The overall concern here has been that at the centre of the banking crisis was a mis-
management of risk; and at the centre of the management of risk is the board, and 
more particularly the NED.  
 
Against the wider concerns of the financial services sector, and the varied demise and 
disappearance of the teni former independent and de-mutualised building societies, a 
number of commentators found renewed interest in the building society mutual 
model.  For example, the formerly referred select committee considered building 
societies to have generally ‘operated a safer business model’ (HC, 2009). The BSA 
sought to emphasise this relatively sound track record in its submission to the Walker 
Review in stating that what is recognised ‘are the shortcomings that have been evident 
in the quality of decision-making of board banks’ yet ‘building societies themselves 
have a good, and improving record on corporate governance’ (BSA, 2009).  
 
Building societies have generally been seen to manage their risks in a more cautious 
and balanced manner, with the notable recent exceptions of the Dunfermline and West 
Bromwich Building Societiesii, reflecting the differing financial construction and legal 
framework of building societies but also their community (mutual) stakeholder 
concerns.  
 
These issues then are at the crux of this research project:  
 
 the interest in trying to establish how building society boards are currently 
viewing risk; 
 how the recent financial crisis has affected their risk perception, risk appetite 
and risk management; 
 both taken from the perspective of Non-Executive Directors, who are 
increasingly seen to have a change of focus of their role and perhaps some 
significant changing expectations of their influence in controlling and 
directing financial institutions - in this case, building societies.   
 
A view may be that a more conservative risk policy will bear dividends in increased 
consumer confidence and wider government and regulatory satisfaction of the mutual 
business model, but an alternative perspective is that the risk pendulum may swing 
too far towards risk certainty and risk avoidance, with a loss of competitive edge as 
the recession recedes. Finally there is a question about how NEDs themselves view 
the recent proposals for a more emphasised role in the Corporate Governance of 
building societies.  
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History and profile of the UK building society sector 
 
Building societies originally grew out of the friendly society movement of the late 
18th century. Their development was very much linked to industrialisation and the 
need for housing for workers. Underpinned by a self-help ethos, the first examples 
were ‘terminating’ societiesiii: members would agree to pay into the society, build 
houses together from the collected funds (allocating the first homes via lottery) until 
every member was housed, at which point any surplus funds were distributed to the 
membership and the society terminated.  
 
The first ‘permanent’ society was formed in 1845 (The Metropolitan Equitable) and 
by 1890 there were 2,579 societies (Short, 1982:121 -131) in existence, with virtually 
every town and industrial centre having  its own society, as well as there being many 
work-based societies. But even at this early stage, the term ‘building society’ was in 
fact a misnomer: as an 1875 Royal Commission noted, ‘building societies do not in 
fact build but rather they simply make advances on building. They are in fact 
investment associations.’ (quoted in Boddy, 1992: 42). This early period of 
development also saw the collapse of what was then the largest building society in the 
country - the Liberator Permanent Benefit Society – predicating further legislation 
(the 1894 Building Societies Act) and averting the first crisis of confidence within 
these new financial institutions.  
 
At this time societies generally remained very small but continuing rationalisation 
through mergers reduced the numbers to 481 in 1970 and 130 by 1988 (Wells, 1979: 
30-37). Their greatest period of growth was between 1955 and 1980 as mass owner-
occupation took hold in UK society and in national housing policy, as well as 
operating under an effective retail deposits oligopoly alongside UK banks.  
 
In line with wider de-regulation and privatisation of both public and regulated sectors, 
the 1986 Building Societies Act substantially widened the powers of societies in the 
field of housing and personal banking services. This also paved the way for the first 
‘de-mutualisation’ of a building society: in 1989 Abbey National resolved to convert 
to plc, and bank status, and in July 1989 the Abbey National Bank PLC was formed.  
The de-mutualisation process was most significantly implemented within larger 
societies such that by 1994, two-thirds of the total assets held within the building 
society sector until then had transferred out of the sector (Cook et al 2001). 
 
Having accounted for 80% of all residential loans in 1994, this figure fell rapidly to 
25% by 1999. Now the building society sector holds just over 20% of UK retail 
deposits and has a little over 20% of the UK mortgage market (FSA 2009b) 
 
Despite various relaxations in legislation and regulation, most notably the 1986 
legislation, building societies are in effect ‘creatures of statute’, being only able to do 
those things they are allowed to do and only operating within the parameters 
established by parliament. Building societies are therefore subject to a number of 
statutory limitsiv which restrict the flexibility of their business model relative to banks. 
According to the FSA, these limitations are necessary to prevent societies from 
undertaking too much business in areas that are considered to be unduly risky. 
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‘One of our supervisory aims is to reduce the risk of building societies failing 
or 
needing to enter rescue mergers, by improving the match between societies’ 
risk 
management processes and the risks associated with their chosen business 
models.’  (FSA 2009: 27). 
 
Aside from the immediate and direct service provision available through building 
societies, a wider and very current consideration at Government level is the 
preservation and indeed encouragement of diversity in the financial services sector. 
As indicated earlier, there has been a continuing rationalisation within the building 
society sector for more than 150 years as well as the de-mutualisation losses from the 
sector.  This rationalisation of the sector continues, their numbers further reducing 
from 59 in 2008 so that there are now just 50 independent building societies operating 
in the UK at the time of writing and following the most recent takeover of the Chelsea 
by the Yorkshire Building Society. 
 
The rationalisation process is not easy to reverse, with the Ecology Building Society 
being the only newly created society in recent years (established in 1981). Without 
significant Government support, regulatory requirements for a healthy balance sheet 
and operational track record ‘make it virtually impossible to create a new society from 
scratch’ (Leadbetter and Christie 1999). 
 
The Non Executive Director: their role and remit 
 
A Non-Executive Director (NED) is someone who has no significant interests or 
management responsibilities to a company or organisation other than that of being a 
director. A NED plays a key part in corporate governance and in the functioning and 
ethos of the unitary board. Their role has been endorsed and clarified in a series of 
corporate governance reviews and in a variety of sector specific policy guidelines and 
regulatory requirements.  
 
The Cadbury Report (1992) considered that NEDs should: 
   
‘bring an independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance, 
resources, including key appointments, and standards of conduct … [and] the 
calibre and number of non-executive directors on a board should be such that 
their views will carry significant weight in the board’s decisions.’ 
 
The Higgs Review (2003) provided the most comprehensive review and advice on 
the role and responsibilities of the NED noting that as members of the unitary board, 
all directors are required to: 
 provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of 
prudent and effective controls which enable risk to be assessed and managed; 
 set the company’s strategic aims and review management performance;  
 set the company’s values and standards  
 
In addition to these requirements for all directors, the role of the non-executive 
director has the following key elements: 
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 Strategy: NEDs should constructively challenge and contribute to the 
development of strategy. 
 Performance: NEDs should scrutinise the performance of management in 
meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of 
performance. 
 Risk: NEDs should satisfy themselves that financial information is accurate 
and that financial controls and systems of risk management are robust and 
defensible. 
 People: notably remuneration of executive directors and in appointing, and 
where necessary removing, senior management and in succession planning. 
  
As part of the research team providing information and advice to the Higgs Review, 
McNulty et al. (2002) identified the need for NEDs to consider both their strategic and 
control roles and the (potential) tensions and conflicts that may arise between these. 
More specifically they considered three behavioural dynamics expected from NEDs: 
 
 Engaged and Non-Executive; 
 Challenge and support; 
 Independence and involvement. 
 
The Walker Review further focussed, amongst other issues, on the role of the NED 
with the expectation of evolution and development of current ‘best practice’ rather 
than radical change. It included a number focussed specifically on position of the 
NED in terms of their training and support and with regard to their need to provide 
challenge and control. This is considered further later in this paper.  
 
Earlier Governance reports, including the Cadbury Report and Higgs Review, have 
subsequently been incorporated within the more comprehensive and overarching 
guidance of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2010). This forms the 
principle and fundamental source of advice on governance within both the UK 
Corporate world, but also as a baseline reference for guidance within a range of 
sectors and business areas.   
 
Notwithstanding all of the above, the NED is in strictest terms, no different from an 
executive board member in holding the same fiduciary and governing responsibilities 
within a unitary board. But the reality of what an NED does and their role and remit, 
and the context in which NEDs ‘operate’ can be somewhat different.  
 
Elsewhere empirical research (Hobeche and Garrow, 2005) has concluded that: 
 
1. Effective governance may be at risk, as a result of: 
a. Boards being ‘risk-averse’ 
b. Board evaluation being of a ‘tick-box’ approach  
2. NED roles are still unclear, noting 
a. NED roles are increasingly onerous 
b. NED work requires ‘soft skills’ more than the previous Board or top 
management experience may alone imply 
3. There is a shrinking talent pool of NEDs, as 
a. The pool is drying-up 
b. Board diversity remains limited 
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4. There is little help provided to new NEDs, in relation to induction and training 
 
Their report concluded that, post-Higgs and other reports, ‘board practices may be 
changing less quickly than recommended by Higgs et al’ and by inference the role of 
NED is both a challenging and challenged role in which individuals must apply 
themselves.   
 
 
Key issues from Turner and Walker Reviews (both 2009) 
 
Turner Review (2009) 
 
The Turner Review was undertaken by the Chair of the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) at the behest of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in order to review and make 
recommendations for reforming UK and international approaches to the way banks 
are regulated. It identified three underlying causes of the crisis: macro-economic 
imbalances, faulty and misapplied financial innovation and key deficiencies in bank 
capital and liquidity regulations.  These were further underpinned by an exaggerated 
faith in the concept of self-correcting markets.  
 
The Turner Review, reporting in March 2009, concluded that there needed to be a 
renewed concern for: 
 
 Fundamental changes in capital, liquidity and published accounts 
 Institutional and geographic coverage: economic substance not legal form 
 Other important changes: credit ratings, remuneration and counterparty risks 
 Macro-prudential analysis and the need for intellectual challenge 
 A new FSA approach to supervision: more intrusive and more systemic 
 Governance and risk management: firm responsibilities and structures 
 “Narrow banking” versus “investment banking”: major constraints but not 
complete separation? 
 Cross-border banks: more international cooperation and more national 
powers 
 
Ironically the FSA was also seen by the new incoming UK Government as part of the 
problem in itself and as a key element of the ‘tripartite agreement’ between the FSA, 
the Treasury and the central Bank of England which were considered to have ‘utterly 
failed’ both before and after the crisis according to the new Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Mr. George Osborne: ‘The FSA became a narrow regulator, almost 
entirely focused on rules-based regulation.’v  
 
In its place, but yet to be formally constituted, is to be a new Consumer Protection and 
Markets Authority.  
 
Walker Review (2009) 
 
The Walker Review was published in November 2009 and provided 39 
recommendations for change based on five broad areas: 
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 Board size, composition and qualification – reference to board balance, 
knowledge and understanding; time commitment and dedicated support;  
 Functioning of the board and evaluation of performance – emphasising 
the role of NEDs in challenge, with increased expectations for the role of 
chairman and senior independent director (SID) and more generally in 
financial and board leadership experience; enhanced expectations in terms 
board appraisal and performance review; 
 The role of institutional shareholders: communication and engagement -  
whilst less relevant to the building society sector, highlights further best 
practice from the revised Combined Code;  
 Governance of risk – the establishment of a Board Risk Committee 
supported by high-level direct reporting from a Chief Risk Officer (CRO), as 
well as other independent advice as necessary; 
 Remuneration – various detailed notes of recommendation or the review, 
form and performance expectations attached to remuneration packages 
especially that directed at “high end” employees 
 
 
The research plan and methodology 
 
Focus and overall structure 
The focus of the research and the approach and scoping of the research methodology 
essentially took place in two parts: 
 
Phase 1:   
Initial outline questionnaires distributed to all 52 building societies (reduced to 50 
with the merger of Yorkshire with Chelsea and with merger of Chesham and Skipton) 
requesting information from Company Secretaries and more specifically directed 
towards the Chair of Audit and one other NED. This was distributed via e-mail with 
support from the BSA in promoting responses and engagement.  
 
Questions were classified under four sections and focused on: 
 
Section One: Changes in the competitive & regulatory environment 
 
a) Views on the Walker Review 
b) The overall competitive environment for Building Societies 
 
Section Two: Your building society and responses to change 
  
a) Perceptions of the Boards overall view of risk 
b) The embedding of risk management 
c) Changes in the governance structure and remuneration policy 
 
Section Three: Your role as an NED 
 
a) The general role and perception of the Board 
b) Training and preparedness for the role of NED 
c) Current confidence as NED 
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And given the specific focus and form of financial service as defined by the ‘mutual’ 
label, section four was a single question seeking views and opinions on the ‘dividend 
of mutuality’ for the building society sector and the specific building society in 
question. 
 
Two societies did not return questionnaires but indicated a willingness to engage at 
Phase 2. The response rate for phase one was: 
 
 Substantial return (ie at least 1 NED fully completed questionnaire) = 13 societies 
(25%) 
 Others confirming willingness to participate in stage 2 = 2 Societies (4%) 
 Confirmed to be not participating = 4 Societies 
 
The response rate, at a combined total of 29% was therefore slightly lower than that 
expected of around 35-40%. Significantly, but perhaps as might be expected, it is the 
smaller Societies (i.e. those with assets of less than c. £350m) that have been less 
inclined to respond not least because of their staffing complement often limits the 
completion of such surveys.  
 
Phase 2:  
This was based on a series of one-to-one interviews of NEDs to provide a further 
informed perspective on key issues and concerns. Our initial target sample here was 
20 in total, stratified according to Peer Group classifications, and the completed 
interviews were [NB this is to date, work is still ongoing at the time of writing – July 
2010]: 
 
 Peer Group 1: Asset size over £1bn – 6 completed  
 Peer Group 2: Asset size of between £400m and £1bn – 4 completed  
 Peer Group 3: Asset size of less than £400m – 4 completed  
 
The range of society types, location and range of products is, in our view, a 
reasonable reflection of the full range of Societies although we some further benefit 
may have derived from a further niche market Society representation (geographically 
or by focus). The authors are still looking at responses that will assist with this 
research deficit.   
 
 
Research responses and commentary 
 
The summary responses here are provided in respect of each question taken from the 
original questionnaire, which then became the focus of more detailed discussions 
within the interview stage. With each question was provided a short preamble to help 
indicate the main areas of concern and, in part at least, the rationale for the inclusion 
of the question. The preamble is shown under each question in italics.  
 
Section One: Changes in the competitive & regulatory environment 
 
Q1 Views on the Walker Review 
The Walker Report provided a wide-ranging review of the Corporate Governance of 
UK Banking Industry. The findings and the implications are still being digested in 
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many institutions and organisations. Here we are interested in receiving NEDs 
overall assessment of the value of the report to the wider Building Society sector and 
the reasons why they are of this view. 
 
The responses in the initial questionnaire were predominantly favourable towards the 
Walker Review, with 20 of the 24 responses confirming a positive view of the value 
of the Report. One respondee indicated very favourable support and 3 holding a 
negative view.  
 
Comments favourably supporting Walker included: 
 
‘The Review encourages further challenge by NEDs but also emphasises the need 
for more training and support from within the organisation’ 
 
‘Requirements for and role of Board Risk Committee’  
 
‘Emphasises longer term rewards and claw-back provisions’ 
 
‘it should encourage more detailed scrutiny of risks’ 
 
‘it indicates and reinforces the time commitment necessary in the NED role’ 
 
‘At least the Review is sensible and balanced!’ 
 
Areas of concern noted included: 
 
‘Enhanced corporate governance can help in raising standards of decision-
making and risk management but is no panacea and has to be seen in the context 
of a wider approach that includes effective supervision … of those pursuing 
riskier business models and those of sufficient size to be of systemic importance’ 
 
 ‘Too strong a an adherence to every aspect will create either too large a board 
or, a board of 55-65 year old males with banking/financial services experience 
alone’ 
 
‘There is a danger that, if handled in the wrong way, the relationship of ED and 
NED becomes confrontational and moves away from being a unitary board’ 
 
‘It may be interpreted by some in too prescriptive a way – too much “one size fits 
all” – with a tick box interpretation of what makes a good board’ 
 
‘The danger is that Boards go for ‘safe’ options in appointing NEDs: high profile 
‘names’, ex-CEOs of large Corporations, who might well be part of the problem’ 
 
Perhaps the most strongly worded and unfavourable response was that, for the 
smaller financial institution, the Review suggests: 
 
‘It’s overkill, and in danger of throwing the babies out with the bathwater!’ 
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Q2 The overall competitive environment for building societies 
Through the financial crisis there has been some evidence of renewed interest and 
support for the Mutual model, but there has at the same time been the high-profile 
failure of the Dunfermline Society and problems experienced at the West Bromwich 
Society. The competitive landscape is still in some flux and over the short-term it 
might be expected that there will be a period of reflection and a focus on stabilisation 
for many across the wider financial services sector. Here we are interested in NED 
views over the short to medium term – say the next 12 to 18 months – and the balance 
of threats and opportunities facing the Building Society sector.  
 
The responses in the initial questionnaire were predominantly pessimistic, as perhaps 
might be expected in the current/recent climate. So 17 of the 24 responses identified 
more threats than opportunities in the business environment. Then 5 respondents 
identified significantly more threats than opportunities and just one seeing 
predominantly more opportunities. One respondee failed to provide a clear answer.  
 
Some of the challenges identified included: 
 
‘Interest rates are so low it’s almost impossible to trade profitably’ 
 
‘Margins being squeezed and there’s an unlevel playing field, especially with 
Government backed financial institutions.’ 
 
‘The new capital requirements and liquidity management regimes are draconian 
for the smaller society.’ 
 
‘(Some) reputational issues for the sector [ref: to Dunfermline] and perhaps FSA 
sees sector as part of the problem not part of the solution?’ 
 
‘Payments to Financial Services Compensatory Scheme!!’ 
 
‘Core markets are fractured: savings and mortgage markets both down.’ 
 
‘Public sector retreat/cut-backs.’ 
 
‘Major focus on PLC financial interests, including Governments.’ 
 
‘Excess and at times inappropriate regulation. Also availability of suitable NEDs 
to match regulatory expectations.’ 
 
‘Regulatory ‘pendulum’ has swung too far.’ 
 
‘Very tight managerial/administrative costs against market % levels.’ 
 
‘The Building Society model is under severe stress … we’re really just treading 
water until interest rates rise.’ 
 
‘If Nationwide ever went to a bank, other large ones would be likely to follow and 
the sector could all but disappear.’ 
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‘The FSA Sourcebook is an attack on mutuals – the FSA have an agenda and its to 
reduce the number of mutuals.’ 
 
‘View going around that regulator wants ‘Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs’ [ie 
Nationwide plus seven large regionals].’ 
 
Views on the potential opportunities included: 
 
‘Focus on mortgages as a core product – “stick to the knitting”, emphasising 
community benefits alongside housing needs/requirements’ 
 
‘We are a niche player with an attractive brand that has customer trust and 
confidence – far more so than the banks.’ 
 
‘Good customer service and branch network – public need for local identity and 
allegiance.’ 
 
‘Trust in the sector and in the individual brands.’ 
 
‘Varied routes to market using modern technology reaching out to willing 
customers.’ 
 
‘Aggressive marketing of mutual concept and mutual model – establish benefit of 
diverse service provision for customer choice.’ 
 
‘Further rationalisation … Inevitably further mergers in the sector leading to 
fewer, but stronger, societies going forward.’ 
 
‘Great potential in sharing costs, perhaps even cross-mutuals, if we can only 
make it happen!’ 
 
Q3 Perceptions of the boards’ overall view of risk 
A key focus and concern for all of the recent reports, reviews and discussion has 
been the prevailing risk culture of the financial services industry. It is true that this 
is easier to discuss than determine, but risk culture is concerned not just with what 
happens but how risk is perceived and considered: the acknowledgement and 
promotion of constructive questioning and challenge throughout the organisation 
but especially at Board level. Here we are interested in NED views about the 
current risk culture – most specifically the risk appetite and risk taking behaviour - 
as demonstrated in their society and any perceived changes in response to various 
reports (e.g. the Walker report).  
 
This question produced a more varied response, perhaps confirming the diversity of 
individual views and that the assessment of a risk appetite is in every respect, a 
subjective and relative one. Nevertheless the summary from the 25 responses were: 3 
saw a shift towards being significantly more risk averse; 11 viewed a more risk averse 
approach; 4 were balanced; 1 indicated a less risk averse culture.  
 
 
Section Two: Your building society and responses to change 
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Q3 Perceptions of the boards overall view of risk 
A key focus and concern for all of the recent reports, reviews and discussion has 
been the prevailing risk culture of the financial services industry. It is true that this 
is easier to discuss than determine, but risk culture is concerned not just with what 
happens but how risk is perceived and considered: the acknowledgement and 
promotion of constructive questioning and challenge throughout the organisation 
but especially at Board level. We are interested here in NED views about their 
current risk culture – most specifically the risk appetite and risk taking behaviour - 
and any perceived changes in response to various reports (e.g. the Walker report).  
 
The focus was on identifying if there was a concern about being more or less risk 
averse.  4 answers indicated a concern about being less risk averse and 1 significantly 
concerned. 9 were concerned about being more risk averse and 1 significantly so, with 
5 a balanced view. Clearly the level of concern expressed is itself determined by 
where a NED believes their society currently sits and in which direction risk may 
shift. This question produced a variety of additional comments and we present here 
more individual quotations for illustration:    
 
‘Yes, there has been a shift in risk appetite – and for the better. My concern as a 
NED would be us becoming less risk averse as we come out of the recession and 
“being tempted” to take greater risks.’ 
 
‘I worry that excessive concentration on obvious existing risks will reduce the 
chance of identifying the next big challenge to come along OR reduce the chances 
of us taking up profitable opportunities.’  
 
‘The need to understand and handle the Capital Requirements Directives (CRD) 
meant the game changed for NEDs – we needed to gear up to a more 
sophisticated approach.’ 
 
‘We’ve always been risk averse, but gradually less so. I’d say we’re simply more 
risk aware and know that we’ll need to take more risk in some areas, but hopefully 
in a carefully managed way.’ 
 
‘Over the year we’ve sought to maintain and attract high quality mortgage 
business – modest Loan To Value (LTV), affordability criteria, specialist 
underwriting on a case-by-case basis – we’re determined not to compromise our 
quality criteria.’ 
 
‘Our BS has consistently operated a risk averse model and moved very cautiously 
up the risk curve BUT we can see that the current culture (eg reflecting Walker 
etc) might make this too extreme and restrict opportunities.’ 
 
‘XY has always adopted a risk averse attitude … recently we’ve tightened our 
lending criteria but have raised our average LTV a little given lower house 
prices.’  
 
‘We hope to keep within our current risk profile but some relaxation may be 
necessary, but this would be limited and gradual.’ 
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‘On balance I guess we’re more risk averse but that’s appropriate and not a point 
of concern: we’ve tightened our underwriting criteria and substantially withdrawn 
from commercial lending (but will re-engage when appropriate).’ 
 
‘Traditionally we’ve been at the lower end of risk and don’t want to be even more 
risk averse than we already are – business is about taking risks and profits are the 
only way open to us to replenish capital.’ 
 
‘Secured business lending and buy-to-let virtually frozen BUT in our heartland, 
through local branches (where we know the property market well), we’ve 
increased some LTV to first time buyers.’ 
 
‘The Board has generally taken a prudent stance on risk. Our risk appetite hasn’t 
changed but there’s a heightened awareness of the need to manage different risks 
and their (potential) consequences.’ 
 
‘NEDs are demanding more detail, more reassurance, but we might drown the 
strategic issues in the detail if we are not careful.’   
 
 ‘We’ve gone back to basics and are focussed entirely on prime residential lending 
for new business.’    
 
‘We’re getting better at assessing and managing risk – better at appropriate 
pricing for a given risk.’ 
 
‘We don’t have an ego … we’re not seeking to be the biggest or a ‘name’, we just 
want to do good business that suits our needs. If we’re careful with our lending 
assessment, based on good knowledge, we can move further.’ 
 
‘We’ve been too conservative in the past and couldn’t survive so we’ve had to 
address some risk issues (pre-Walker) and our risk-taking behaviour is now 
gathering pace, becoming a nimbler business.’ 
 
‘It (risk) has absorbed much Board attention. We’ve had to do rapid catch on risk 
assessment techniques. We are more risk averse but do now review our risk 
appetite more often.’   
 
‘We were risk averse and are more so now. ED’s are swamped by stress testing 
which is often disproportionate to the benefits it gives.’  
 
Q4 The embedding of risk management 
The board is dependent on the quality of information it receives: ‘quality’ including 
issues such as relevance, timeliness, focus and scope, and overall critical incisiveness. 
In a recent report on the wider financial services sector Deloittes noted that ‘the lack 
of effective challenge arose from defective information flows, inadequate risk analysis 
and interpretation’. Management reports provide the means for board member to 
apply and demonstrate their application of critical challenge and facilitate (or hinder) 
high-quality decision-making by boards. Internal reporting is also a primary activity 
determining the ultimate quality of external reporting. Here we are interested in NED 
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views on the quality of internal reporting in support of the NED role and whether the 
importance of Board reporting is embedded in the organisation.  
 
Responses to the questionnaire tended to produce a profile of satisfaction with the 
internal reporting processes: just one NED noted some noticeable inconsistencies, 
making internal challenge more difficult. Another provided an inconclusive response. 
Of the remaining 22 responses, 10 noted effective internal reporting and 12 very 
effective reporting. It is acknowledged that this is in itself inconclusive, but still 
interesting in that it may yet indicate either safe secure and effective internal reporting 
and Board scrutiny, or a continuing difficulty for NEDs in assessing if they are indeed 
aware of, and receive reports on all the relevant critical issues. The detailed 
commentary in the questionnaire and in interviews did however provide further 
insight: 
 
‘There were some inconsistencies but much resolved now, and the setting up of an 
ALCO to support the Board was a good step forward.’ 
 
‘Exec Risk Committee now report though Audit, so greater comfort and 
challenge.’ 
 
‘We’ve monthly reporting of KPI’s with exceptions and action plans.’ 
 
‘There’s a very open management culture with a commitment to improvement: we 
can see that internal management information needs further work and that’s 
happening.’ 
 
‘We are reliant on key people for MI with no rotation of people as we’re quite 
small.’ 
 
‘Stress testing and scenario planning greatly improved with more active and 
engaged debate around these.’ 
 
‘Focused reports with extensive KPI review – reporting generally overhauled in 
2008 with Board Risk Committee and other changes improving quality and depth 
of information flow.’ 
 
‘Credit risk reporting very well established – funding, liquidity and profitability 
reporting only just catching up “post-crisis”.’ 
 
‘Committee packs better organised and structured and ALCO improving with 
“maturity ladder”. Still can be a challenge “seeing the wood for the trees” in 
detailed reporting.’ 
 
‘Some MI reports still problematic but new Audit Manager led to step-change in 
reporting and discussion at Audit Committee.’ 
 
‘Improved IA reports and shared use of IA with another mutual has provided 
cross-learning. But we’ve also learned some absence of problems is due to good 
management of process by individual staff rather than comprehensive procedures 
etc. which needs addressing.’ 
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‘ICAAP and TCF much improved – better overview of all business rather than 
separate business streams. Reflects more focussed management/organisational 
structure.’ 
 
‘The problem is that most organisations get into difficulty because “risk is too 
difficult to call”.’ 
 
Q5 Changes in the governance structure and remuneration policy 
The Turner Review questioned whether changes in governance structures are 
required to increase the independence of risk management functions. The Walker 
Review itself recommends further consideration of governing roles and 
responsibilities including the formation of a Board Risk Committee and an enhanced 
status for the Chief Risk Officer – both being seen as ‘structural enablers’ of effective 
risk managementvi. Here we are interested in their society’s responses to these 
recommendations and their views on the relative importance and support for 
structural change. Given the public and political focus on executive remuneration 
across financial services sector, we also asked a specific question regarding the 
interaction of the remuneration committee with other committees. 
 
From both the Company Secretary and the NED Questionnaires, the following 
changes were noted within the research sample: 
 
Relevant change Introduced Comment 
Senior Independent 
Director 
1  
Chief Risk Officer 4 1 - now reporting to Board direct 
1 – currently reviewing with 
intention to implement 
1 – indicated incorporated with FD 
role 
Board Risk Committee 
(BRC) 
5 3 – no requirement for BRC at this 
time 
3 – included as Audit & Risk  
1 – currently reviewing proposals 
for change 
Remuneration Policy 
and/or Structure 
3 2 – currently reviewing proposals 
for change 
 
‘We’re too small to warrant a separate CRO.’ 
 
‘The scope to have a dedicated CRO is limited.’ 
 
‘We don’t think we need a separate BRC, the task is incorporated very 
efficiently in our Audit & Risk Committee’ 
 
‘The society is not involved in non-standard products and bonus levels are 
both generally limited and focussed on risk management rather than financial 
performance per se.’ 
 
 16 
‘Bonus deferral is already under discussion, but to note that recent 
governance proposals assume that variable pay (ie bonus) can be made as 
‘non-cash’ and/or easily deferred – this is more difficult where equity (shares) 
is not available and the current climate demands short-term survival as much 
as consideration of long-term risks.’ 
 
‘Some changes in remuneration but tinkering rather than anything wholesale 
– not seen as a major issue with some longevity amongst senior Exec. They’ve 
been in for the long haul!’ 
 
‘If we had a more complex business model I could perhaps see the point of a 
BRC – but we don’t.’ 
 
‘In a small organisation people need to wear more than one hat, so a separate 
CRO is pretty unlikely.’ 
 
‘More significant issue is: “does Risk get sufficient space at the Board – that’s 
the challenge.’ 
 
‘We have a simple business model – CRO not necessary and simply 
unaffordable for many B.Socs.’ 
 
‘Remuneration is predominantly salary.’ 
 
Section Three: Your role as an NED 
 
Q6 The general role and perception of the NED 
Advice on Board Governance has consistently emphasised the need for effective 
independent critical review and oversight, and the role of the NED should be central 
to this process. This has again been noted in the Walker Review with a number of 
proposals and recommendations to support this. In practice Board Governance can 
be undermined and the NED role diminished by a strong executive team. ICSA for 
instance, in responding to the Walker consultation, questioned whether steps were 
needed to encourage boards to understand that they are ‘one step down’ from the 
owners rather than ‘one step up’ from the executive management. Here we are 
interested in NED views on their current role and their perception of others about 
their role. 
 
There was a very clear feeling amongst NED respondents that their position was both 
emphasised and supported within the Board. 12 respondents indicated this was 
strongly the case and the other 10 considering it very strongly so. As can be seen from 
the more detailed commentary this endorsement is derived from both internal 
reflections but also the external governance environment as outlined in formal reports 
such as the Walker Review. Nevertheless there are, as can be seen, still some areas of 
concern regarding the wider understanding and appreciation of the role of an NED.  
 
Comments included: 
 
‘Our role is to represent the members’ interests and provide challenge, guidance 
and support to the executive in their responsibilities.’ 
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‘Clear response to NED challenge and queries.’  
 
‘In my earlier experiences in smaller societies, I was concerned that NEDs acted 
as “quasi-executives”, which is clearly not our role. Much better in recent years 
with a clear recognition of our oversight role.’ 
 
‘Remember – in a mutual NEDs carry out the only oversight which exists as they 
are no owners to oversee the board.’  
 
‘Execs realise and appreciate NEDs are “critical friends”.’ 
 
‘Our ARROW results provide positive of our contribution.’  
 
‘It’s not easy to find good NEDs who have the time available and, where they still 
have exec roles, to make the switch to behaving as a NED.’ 
 
‘I just wonder how people can hold several NED roles … maybe this should be 
prescribed?’ 
 
A number of respondees gave examples and case illustrations of how and where they 
had applied and asserted their influence in key decisions and policy/strategy 
interventions some of which remain confidential within the project team. 
 
NEDs were also asked if they had seen any change in role or perception during 2009: 
 
‘There’s an increased awareness of the importance and responsibility of the 
(NED) role in the society and as a representative of the greater community.’ 
 
‘The Walker Review has certainly increased awareness of the NED’s 
qualifications, role and responsibilities.’ 
 
‘More active support for NED learning and development.’ 
 
‘The demands on those NEDs with real financial services experience are 
increasing considerably …. But the NED expertise on brand, customer service etc. 
is just as important.’ 
 
‘I am concerned about the trend of external regulation negatively affects NEDs. 
NEDs should not just be “policemen” – they should contribute to strategy 
formation and related decision-making. We need to hold on to the spirit of being a 
unitary board.’ 
 
‘Our exposure to staff and to members could be improved – staff perceive that 
NEDs are removed from the business.’ 
 
‘NEDs come into their own in times of strife … [such as in recent past].’ 
 
‘More aware of personal responsibility, especially if FSA go after individuals. Its 
at the forefront of our minds!’ 
 18 
 
‘I think the (Walker) review and formal review goes against the culture of the 
Board we are trying to create here – more headteacher role and not the 
appropriate style for us.’ 
 
‘Changes in the external world have emphasised the NED role, but much of this is 
at Board level and understanding lower down the organisation is lacking. We 
need to engage more with staff as well as members.’ 
 
Q7 Training and preparedness for the role of NED 
It has long since been recognised that, to be effective, NEDs need suitable training 
(induction and ongoing) and material support. This has been extended in terms of 
requiring NED involvement in and chairing of key committees, and in growing 
expectations for board renewal and board appraisal/review. More specifically the 
Walker Review outlined recommendations for more extensive time commitments from 
NEDs to meet their extended responsibilities. Here we are interested in NED views on 
what was provided to assist with your preparedness for Board work and views on 
current and projected time commitments.  
 
This was divided into two sub-questions: the preparedness for the role and secondly 
the projected time commitments as an NED.  
 
Some found themselves well prepared for their role: 13 reported well designed 
induction and training and support with another 5 seeing some evidence of the same. 
But there were also 4 others who reported only modest preparation for their NED role. 
In terms of time commitment, 3 found it much more of a commitment than expected 
and another 16 more than expected. Only 3 found it as expected or less.  
 
Comments were focussed on any changes in the NED preparedness since 2009 as well 
as more general views on induction and training: 
 
‘Bigger Board packs and more complex issues, all requiring analysis and 
comment.’ 
 
‘More quality reports – we’re all more aware of our responsibilities and our 
performance being in the spotlight.’ 
 
‘Increased requirement for understanding trading areas of the business (ALCO).’ 
 
‘Time commitment probably increased by 2-3 times from I started and will 
increase again next year (2010).’ 
 
‘Increased time inevitably reflects response to the crisis and the complexity of the 
regulatory changes that have ensued.’ 
 
‘Time and the level of scrutiny will deter some candidates, so we may have a 
shortage of quality NEDs in the future.’ 
 
‘Increased oversight/review by FSA.’ 
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‘Fees must be set to reflect demands on NEDs in the future ..’ 
 
‘We are revamping our induction and ongoing training in the near future.’ 
 
‘There’s a longer lead in time now with FSA approval … this and general 
increased time commitment will mean the recruitment pool is likely to be retired 
persons.’   
 
‘We need people from within but also external to the sector (fresh faces, fresh 
minds) but a lot of sector terminology/jargon to comes to terms with for new 
NEDs.’ 
 
‘NED remuneration must increase if the inputs/outputs can be delivered. Smaller 
mutuals may find it even more difficult to compete from a limited pool of potential 
NEDs – especially if HQ is away from London.’ 
 
‘Real challenge for Board/Committee Chairs, and for “Senior Independents”.’ 
 
‘NEDs are becoming scarce animals.’ 
 
Q8 Current confidence as NED 
Here we are simply asking if, in the light of the widespread focus on the financial 
crises and general Board governance, this has impacted on NEDs confidence in their 
effectiveness and/or that of their fellow NEDs.   
 
This was again divided into two sub-questions: confidence in the NEDs own role and 
then in the full NED complement on the Board. For the most part NEDs felt more 
confident in their role: 1 reported much increased confidence and another 16 some 
increased confidence. 3 were ‘balanced’ in their review and 1 less confident. For the 
second element, 15 reported much increased confidence in the NED presence on the 
Board and another 4 some increased confidence. 3 were balanced and 1 indicated a 
reduced confidence in the NEDs within the Board.   
 
Comments with the questionnaire were quite limited, but the interviews brought out 
some further detail and insight: 
 
‘Events in 2009 acted as a ‘test’ and accelerated developments already underway’ 
 
‘We are at risk of seeing ourselves as a separate (business) form, whereas we 
need the calibre and experience appropriate to the banking sector.’ 
 
‘No real change in confidence either for myself or for my colleagues.’ 
 
‘Over the past 5 years the Board has sought to adopt appropriate strategies that 
are risk-based  … and to anticipate the requirements of the FSA and other parties 
that oversee the Society.’ 
 
‘The FSA could have engaged NEDs much earlier in 2007/08 in the wake of the 
crisis …’ 
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‘I don’t think my confidence level has changed, but we have probably all learned 
a few lessons.’ 
 
‘Board confidence has increased collectively as well as at the individual level. 
We’ve had some previous decisions and strategies endorsed by some of the recent 
events.’ 
 
‘The element of challenge has increased but also some evidence of better 
collective working within/across the Board and with wider Executive.’   
 
‘It feels better, more confident BUT NEDs must be prepared to step down if their 
independence compromised – this just doesn’t happen enough in the business 
world.’ 
 
‘More confident having navigated through the difficulties with good results.’ 
 
‘There’s a feeling we are all in it together’  
 
‘Still feel we are compressed by regulation and it tends to makes us look 
backwards, when the fun bit is looking forward!’  
 
The ‘dividend of mutuality’ 
An important focus for building societies is on the need to continue to identify and 
demonstrate the benefits that mutuality confers, both to the member but also the wider 
range of key stakeholders. This has been described in various circles as the ‘dividend 
of mutuality’. Here we are interested in NED views about what this means from their 
own perspective and with regard to their individual society. Here we used some 
commonly identified measures or indicators of mutuality. 
 
This was in many respects an opportunity for the NEDs to reflect more widely on the 
Building Society sector and its business rationale and unique selling point(s). The 
overall response profile is tabulated below, but as with other questions, the insight is 
delivered in some of the questionnaire and interview responses.  
 
Key indicator Number of times ranked highest 
or joint highest in questionnaire 
response 
Democratic Engagement with 
Members 
12 
Keener Pricing Policies (without 
shareholder dividend) 
7 
Member Friendly Practices 13 
Longer Term Policies and 
Commitments  
13 
Mutual Culture 17 
 
Further comments made were many and varied: 
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‘We emphasise our mutuality by putting people before profit, and by ensuring that 
our profit is sufficient to grow the society – a good balancing act if we can get it 
right!’ 
 
‘We need the reintroduction of a Glass-Steagalvii type separation of all different 
financial institutions and associated risk  …  to return to simple effective mutual 
values in support of a core objective – affordable home ownership.’ 
 
‘Our objective is to remain a local, independent mutually owned building society 
and we have no intention of living beyond our means by offering products we 
cannot afford’ 
 
 ‘To survive in the long-term mutuals must be given a fair and level playing field 
on which to operate. There appears to be little or no effort on behalf of various 
authorities [sic] to put things right despite warm words about mutuality’ 
 
‘It is important that the mutual model continues as an alternative to conventional 
business, especially in financial services where public trust has taken such a 
knock.’ 
 
‘It’s a matter of frequent discussion, usually prompted by NEDs, but it’s not fully 
understood by members and more could be made of it.’ 
     
A frequent point made was that internally, from the executive through to front line 
staff, NEDs did feel that there was a very positive sense of being different, providing 
a more community conscious and focused business offer. NEDs were very much 
aware however of the difficulty in making this connect with the membership and even 
more so with the wider public: 
 
‘It’s an easy thing to talk about, but much harder to demonstrate and deliver.’ 
 
‘We feel we have a very sound (potential) USP in being the only serious high 
street competitor to the banks, but we find it very difficult to communicate this 
USP to existing/prospective (mutual) members’ 
 
‘I think the concept of mutuality is very confused in the building society sector, 
and possibly becoming more so. We need to start from the customer perspective 
and what mutuality can do for them, not the other way around.’ 
 
‘Mutuality is a state of mind for a business, but one not fully understood, or of 
immediate concern to the public. But they do understand different behaviour, and 
we are starting a journey to try to reinforce the mutual ‘difference’ in a way that 
might also appeal to a younger membership.’ 
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Summary discussion  
 
The research to date has identified a series of views related to the three main areas of 
investigation:  
 
1. What has been identified with regard to the Walker Review are: 
 
a) The need for proportionality in applying the key elements of the Walker 
Review. It is felt that the main target of the Review is the larger financial 
institution and some recommendations may incur disproportionate 
management costs for smaller Building Societies; 
b) The intensified emphasis on NEDs coming from financial backgrounds, 
indeed having detailed financial services experience, would be detrimental to 
the retail business focus and mutual ethos of the sector. A continuing need for 
board diversity was evident; 
c) The key remains the human element, both for the individual appointee in how 
they go about their activities as an NED, and how the Board act and undertake 
their tasks as a collective. In the end, how to challenge in a positive and 
effective way cannot be prescribed. Here NEDs seem to endorse the view that 
‘the key to better corporate governance lies … in the social dynamics of board 
interaction, and in the competence, integrity, and constructive involvement of 
individual directors’ (Nadler, 2004: 102) 
 
Looking at the competitive environment the current status was pre-dominantly one of 
‘weathering the storm’, with NEDs expressing circumstances in the ‘here and now’ 
rather than over longer period, or even medium term. This point is also identified in 
the next section.   
 
2. Considering recent response to change and perspectives on risk, our research 
indicates: 
 
a) A feeling of being better informed and equipped to consider and assess and 
manage risk in a focused and systematic way; 
b) Notwithstanding the above, a reluctance to adopt some of the organisational 
and structural changes envisaged by Walker (Chief Risk Officer; Board Risk 
Committee) either as a result of these being seen to be less relevant to the 
building society business model and/or financially challenging especially for 
the smaller societies; 
c) Clear indications of a risk-averse sector or at least  a desire to express a 
concern and a status in which ‘risk security’ was paramount, with some 
evidence that this was becoming more ingrained not just as a result of external 
scrutiny but as an expression of internal policy intent; 
d) A view that the focus on executive remuneration was also less relevant with 
the sector and exaggerated in impact where shareholder bonuses do not exist.  
 
A challenge for NEDs in assessing risk is in considering the ‘up-side’ of risk i.e. in 
promoting entrepreneurial activity opportunities and encouraging the pursuit of 
opportunities.  Deloittes review of the Building Society Sector (December 2009) 
considered how building societies are approaching the ‘weathering of the storm’ noted 
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earlier and envisaged a three stage approach to expectation management as outlined in 
Figure One below:  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Building Society Sector Review – Projected Business Environment 
(Deloitte 2009) 
 
 
 
Deloitte’s view is that ‘Redefinition to deliver long term value will require focus on 
multiple improvement levers over a multi-year period – underpinned by effective 
management of market expectations’ (Deloitte 2009).  
 
The research evidence is that NEDs have mentally positioned themselves with stages 
one and two, but there is much less evidence of being ready to shift to stage three, or 
any certainty that this can be achieved without some additional policy support from 
the government. This issue is also picked up again in the concluding commentary.  
 
3. In respect of the role, remit and perspective of the NED, the research has 
identified that within the sector: 
 
a) There is wide spread support and endorsement of the fundamental unitary 
board model and the contribution that NEDs make within the building society 
sector; 
b) There has been an increased concern and focus on both induction processes 
and ongoing training for NEDs; 
c) Many NEDs and board seem more confident in their individual and perhaps 
more specifically, the collective abilities and application of their colleague 
NEDs and boards, having survived the initial challenges of the recession. 
 
There are, however, areas of concern and pointers for further reflection: 
Increasing  
value & 
sustainability 
Increasing 
mgmt focus & 
commitment Expectation Management 
 
• Retool value creation strategy 
• Liquidity & treasury 
management 
• Opportunistic M&A 
• Revamped credit risk policy and 
reduced volumes 
• Understanding existing risk 
exposures 
• Reacting to regulatory 
challenges 
 
• Rejuvenate the branch 
proposition  
• Intermediary relationship 
reassessed 
• Re-pricing and refocus on 
cross selling  
• New products/markets 
assessed 
• Focus on customer retention 
 
• Long term funding 
strategies 
• Strategic bolt on 
acquisitions 
• Outsource / offshore 
• “Good bank/bad 
bank” 
 
 
‘Stabilisation’ 
‘Back to Basics’ ‘Redefinition’ 
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d) Whilst the role and remit of the NED is understood within the board, there are 
concerns that it is less well understood by other key stakeholders both 
internally and externally; 
e) Many NEDs feel both uncomfortable, and in some instances more 
fundamentally concerned, that their role is being framed ever more within the 
monitoring and ‘watchdog’ role rather than the strategy/control duality 
identified in the earlier literature material; 
f)  The NED role appears to becoming ever more onerous and the time 
requirements and general involvement may increase the cost of NED 
appointments and reduce further the potential future recruitment pool; 
g) Related to the above, and to the Walker Review expectations, there were also 
concerns that an increased weekly/even daily contribution may ‘incorporate’ 
them further into the organisation and organisational culture and blur the very 
independence of the NED; 
h) There is little evidence of external, independent advice being sought or even 
considered, beyond the usual internal/external audit support, in the way 
envisaged by Walker.    
 
In discussing the ‘dividend of mutuality’ we raised with NEDs some fundamental 
issues and discussion points about the nature of mutuality, its future competitive 
strengths and its relevance in the future. Those NEDs taking part in the research 
unanimously expressed a strong affiliation and sentiment towards the concept of 
mutuality (as one might expect!), but with a much less certain or convincing view of 
what that might mean for the future – one respondee noting for instance that ‘the 
comforting words of politicians and academics about mutuality are of little meaning if 
that isn’t translated into something of meaning to future generations of consumers 
and, hopefully, members’.    
 
The potential advantage for a mutual is easy to see. In risk terms for instance, it has 
been recognised for some time that investor-owned companies carry and indeed target 
a higher total risk than mutuals, with investor owned companies accepting riskier lines 
of business and working in geographical areas of high risk (Lamm-Tenant and 
Starks1993). Similarly, considering the failure of two of the de-mutualised societies 
(Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley Banks) Klimecki and Willmott (2009) 
identify the pressures and circumstances around 2007/08 that led to their failures: 
 
‘Beholden to shareholders who prioritised dividends and profitable growth, 
the demutualised banks were under great pressure to meet these demands … 
where dark clouds form, there is usually a silver lining. In this case, it is the 
mutual building societies that have profited from the meltdown of financial 
markets.’  (Klimecki and Willmott 2009: 133)  
 
but they then go on to note that the Cheshire, Derbyshire and Barnsley building 
societies also faltered over this period as a result of difficulties with their loan books.   
 
Musing on the potential long-term governance arrangements for the former building 
societies now under UK Government ownership, Branston et al (2009) considers the 
potential to return these to some form of reformed mutual status, whilst noting, ‘of 
course, any new mutual society will continue to face competitive pressures to act 
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commercially’ (p.20).  Here then is the rub: there may exist a feeling that what 
currently exists is a temporary problem facing all financial service institutions and 
that some return to equilibrium will, in time, occur. But without some significant 
change the equilibrium for building societies is likely to remain challenging and even 
problematic. A niche position may suit some of the smaller societies, but for the 
medium and larger organisations a niche position may be untenable – a classic Porter 
challenge of being “stuck in the middle” – too small for cost advantage but too large 
and remote from their mutual origins to effectively differentiate themselves. What 
most see therefore is a continuing pressure to merge and further rationalise, and 
perhaps to move towards the “Snow White and Seven Dwarfs” scenario one of our 
respondents identified.    
 
But the importance of diversity within the wider financial market has been recognised 
by many and for some time, for example, Llewellyn and Holmes (1991) argue that a 
greater variety of financial institutions provides for increased stability in contrast to a 
much narrower concentration of such institutions. There is in any case a benefit 
derived from the consumer sovereignty and consumer choice in a competitive but 
diverse market.  
 
More recently the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr George Osborne, announced that 
a further Independent Commission on Banking is to commence work. Chaired by Sir 
John Vickers the Commission is to take a view on:  
• Reducing systemic risk in the banking sector, exploring the risk posed by 
banks of different size, scale and function;  
• Mitigating moral hazard in the banking system;  
• Reducing both the likelihood and impact of firm failure; and  
• Promoting competition in both retail and investment banking with a view to 
ensuring that the needs of banks’ customers and clients are efficiently served, 
and in particular considering the extent to which large banks gain competitive 
advantage from being perceived as too big to fail.  
Mr. Osborne, in introducing the proposals for this commission expressed some further 
support for the Building Society/mutual sector(s)viii:  
 
“Building societies and mutuals have an important role to play in the future. We 
want to strengthen them and support those who want to create mutuals.” 
  
Our research is continuing over the summer but on this last point we, and our NED 
research respondents, wait with baited breath … 
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Appendix One: Listing of UK Building Societies by Assets (June 2010 – BSA) 
 
Rank by 
Group 
Assets 
Name of Society Financial Year 
Ended 
Society Assets 
£m 
Group Assets 
£m (see note *) 
1 Nationwide 04 April 2010 190,497 191,397 
2 Yorkshire² 
31 December 
2009 25,194 22,722 
3 Coventry 
31 December 
2009 21,037 18,402 
4 Skipton¹ ³ 
31 December 
2009 15,859 15,569 
− Chelsea² 
31 December 
2009 13,406 13,413 
5 Leeds 
31 December 
2009 9,556 9,545 
6 West Bromwich 31 March 2010 7,962 8,336 
7 Principality 
31 December 
2009 6,213 6,219 
8 Newcastle 
31 December 
2009 4,514 4,620 
9 
Norwich & 
Peterborough 
31 December 
2009 4,251 4,248 
10 Stroud & Swindon 
31 December 
2009 2,723 2,737 
11 Nottingham 
31 December 
2009 2,600 2,600 
12 Kent Reliance 
30 September 
2009 2,251 2,257 
13 Progressive* 
31 December 
2009 1,664 1,664 
14 Cumberland 31 March 2010 1,576 1,574 
15 National Counties 
31 December 
2009 1,210 1,246 
16 Manchester 
31 December 
2009 907 937 
17 Cambridge 
31 December 
2009 908 904 
18 Furness 
31 December 
2009 842 843 
19 Saffron 
31 December 
2009 835 836 
20 Leek United 
31 December 
2009 735 735 
21 Monmouthshire 30 April 2009 649 650 
22 Hinckley & Rugby* 
30 November 
2009 644 644 
23 Newbury 31 October 2009 629 631 
24 Darlington 
31 December 
2009 584 583 
25 Ipswich* 
30 November 
2009 462 462 
 29 
26 Market Harborough 
31 December 
2009 416 417 
27 Melton Mowbray 
31 December 
2009 410 410 
28 Marsden* 
31 December 
2009 356 356 
29 Tipton & Coseley* 
31 December 
2009 350 350 
30 Hanley Economic 31 August 2009 348 349 
31 Scottish 31 January 2010 326 327 
32 Dudley 31 March 2010 313 313 
33 Loughborough* 31 October 2009 278 278 
34 Mansfield, The 
31 December 
2009 274 274 
35 Teachers' 
31 December 
2009 257 257 
36 Bath Investment 
31 December 
2009 252 252 
37 Vernon 
31 December 
2009 246 246 
− Chesham*³ 
30 November 
2009 231 231 
38 Harpenden* 
31 December 
2009 198 198 
39 Swansea 
31 December 
2009 182 182 
40 
Stafford Railway, 
The* 31 October 2009 175 175 
41 
Chorley & District, 
The* 01 February 2010 172 172 
42 Beverley* 
31 December 
2009 165 165 
43 Buckinghamshire* 
31 December 
2009 158 158 
44 Holmesdale* 31 March 2010 152 152 
45 Earl Shilton 31 March 2010 99 99 
46 Ecology, The* 
31 December 
2009 94 94 
47 Shepshed* 
31 December 
2009 93 93 
48 Penrith* 
31 December 
2009 89 89 
49 City of Derry* 
31 December 
2009 38 38 
50 Century* 
31 December 
2009 24 24 
     
The Co-Operative Bank, including Britannia, had total assets of £46,119m as at 31 December 
2009 
     
Notes:     
    
 
¹ Skipton merged with Scarborough BS on 30 March 2009. As at 30/4/08 their Group assets were £2,852m 
² Chelsea merged with Yorkshire on 1 April 2010.    
 30 
³ Chesham merged with Skipton BS on 1 June 2010.   
 
                                               
i
 De-mutualised societies, all of which no longer exist as independent financial service 
institutes [Building Societies Association consumer factsheet – accessed July 10, 2010] 
 
Bradford & Bingley  floated 4 December 2000. Mortgage book  nationalised September 2008. Retail 
savings transferred to  Abbey (Banco Santander) September 2008. Abbey rebranded 
to Santander on 11 January 2010. 
Birmingham Midshires taken over by Halifax, April 1999.  Now a division of Lloyds Banking Group. 
Northern Rock  floated 1 October 1997, currently in temporary public ownership. 
Bristol & West taken over by Bank of Ireland, 28 July 1997. Bristol & West transferred its branch 
network and savings business to Britannia Building Society on 21 September 2005. 
Britannia became part of The Co-operative Financial Services on 1 August 2009. 
Woolwich floated 7 July 1997, taken over by Barclays Bank in October 2000.  Now exists only 
as a trading name of Barclays. 
Halifax  floated 2 June 1997, merged with Bank of Scotland to form HBOS in 2001.  In 
September 2008 Lloyds Bank agreed to take over HBOS. It became part of Lloyds 
Banking Group on 16 January 2009. 
Alliance & Leicester  floated 21 April 1997, acquired by Banco Santander in October 2008. Alliance & 
Leicester is due to be rebranded to Santander in 2010. 
National & Provincial  taken over by Abbey National, 5 August 1996 (ceased trading under this name). 
Cheltenham & Gloucester  taken over by Lloyds Bank, 1 August 1995.  Now exists only as a trading name of the 
Lloyds Banking Group. 
    
Abbey National  
 
floated 12 July 1989, acquired by Banco Santander  in November 2004. Abbey 
rebranded to Santander on 11 January 2010. 
 
ii
 The Dunfermline, being seen as no longer financially viable, was rescued in March 2009 by 
the Bank of England taking on around £1bn in commercial lending and the Society's poorer-
quality and shared ownership, with the Nationwide Building Society the Dunfermline's former 
branches, good loans and deposits. The West Bromwich suffered a ratings downgrading after 
over-extending its buy-to-let and commercial lending but has remained operational after 
financial re-structuring. 
iii
 The first recorded society was established in 1775 – Ketley’s building society in Birmingham  
iv
 The Building Societies Act 1986 requires at least 75% of society lending to be for 
mortgages secured on residential property, retail deposits to account for at least 50% of total 
funding and limits the use of derivatives. 
v
 Mansion House speech June 2010 
vi
 FSA CP 2010/3: Effective Corporate Governance. Essentially stated that each building society needs 
to consider its own risk controls – and whether they need a Board Risk Committee and a senior Risk 
Officer 
vii
 Reference to the Glass-Steagal Act 1932 (US) 
viii
 House of Commons Debate – Financial Services Regulation – June 16 2010 
